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13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude
0085208689 fix: require explicit acknowledgment for wildcard write permission bypass
SECURITY FIX: Addresses authorization_bypass vulnerability (LOW severity)

The allowed_non_write_users='*' configuration previously bypassed write
permission checks for all users with only a warning. This created a
security misconfiguration risk.

Changes:
- Added new input 'bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment' required
  when using wildcard (*)
- Modified checkWritePermissions() to throw error if wildcard used without
  explicit acknowledgment flag
- Updated all documentation (security.md, usage.md) with new requirement
- Updated example workflows to include acknowledgment flag
- Added tests for new validation behavior

This prevents accidental security misconfigurations while maintaining the
feature for intentional use cases like issue triage workflows.

Affected file: src/github/validation/permissions.ts:27
Category: authorization_bypass
Severity: LOW
2026-01-13 23:29:39 +00:00
GitHub Actions
4778aeae4c chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.6 and Agent SDK to 0.2.6 2026-01-13 02:25:17 +00:00
GitHub Actions
b6e5a9f27a chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.4 and Agent SDK to 0.2.4 2026-01-11 00:27:43 +00:00
GitHub Actions
5d91d7d217 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.3 and Agent SDK to 0.2.3 2026-01-09 23:31:55 +00:00
GitHub Actions
90006bcae7 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.2 and Agent SDK to 0.2.2 2026-01-09 00:03:55 +00:00
Alexander Bartash
005436f51d fix: parse ALL --allowed-tools flags, not just the first one (#801)
The parseAllowedTools() function previously used .match() which only
returns the first match. This caused tools specified in subsequent
--allowed-tools flags to be ignored during MCP server initialization.

Changes:
- Add /g flag to regex patterns for global matching
- Use matchAll() to find all occurrences
- Deduplicate tools while preserving order
- Make unquoted pattern not match quoted values

Fixes #800

 #vibe

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-09 01:36:12 +05:30
Ashwin Bhat
1b8ee3b941 fix: add missing import and update tests for branch template feature (#799)
* fix: add missing import and update tests for branch template feature

- Add missing `import { $ } from 'bun'` in branch.ts
- Add missing `labels` property to pull-request-target.test.ts fixture
- Update branch-template tests to expect 5-word descriptions

* address review feedback: update comment and add truncation test
2026-01-08 07:07:54 +05:30
Cole D
c247cb152d feat: custom branch name templates (#571)
* Add branch-name-template config option

* Logging

* Use branch name template

* Add label to template variables

* Add description template variable

* More concise description for branch_name_template

* Remove more granular time template variables

* Only fetch first label

* Add check for empty template-generated name

* Clean up comments, docstrings

* Merge createBranchTemplateVariables into generateBranchName

* Still replace undefined values

* Fall back to default on duplicate branch

* Parameterize description wordcount

* Remove some over-explanatory comments

* NUM_DESCRIPTION_WORDS: 3 -> 5
2026-01-08 06:47:26 +05:30
GitHub Actions
cefa60067a chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.1 and Agent SDK to 0.2.1 2026-01-07 21:30:16 +00:00
GitHub Actions
7a708f68fa chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.0 and Agent SDK to 0.2.0 2026-01-07 20:03:23 +00:00
David Dworken
5da7ba548c feat: add path validation for commit_files MCP tool (#796)
Add validatePathWithinRepo helper to ensure file paths resolve within the repository root directory. This hardens the commit_files tool by validating paths before file operations.

Changes:
- Add src/mcp/path-validation.ts with async path validation using realpath
- Update commit_files to validate all paths before reading files
- Prevent symlink-based path escapes by resolving real paths
- Add comprehensive test coverage including symlink attack scenarios

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-07 10:16:31 -08:00
Ashwin Bhat
964b8355fb fix: use original title from webhook payload instead of fetched title (#793)
* fix: use original title from webhook payload instead of fetched title

- Add extractOriginalTitle() helper to extract title from webhook payload
- Add originalTitle parameter to fetchGitHubData()
- Update tag mode to pass original title from webhook context
- Add tests for extractOriginalTitle and originalTitle parameter

This ensures the title used in prompts is the one that existed when the
trigger event occurred, rather than a potentially modified title fetched
later via GraphQL.

* fix: add title sanitization and explicit TOCTOU test

- Apply sanitizeContent() to titles in formatContext() for defense-in-depth
- Add explicit test documenting TOCTOU prevention for title handling
2026-01-07 23:45:12 +05:30
orbisai0security
c83d67a9b9 fix: resolve high vulnerability CVE-2025-66414 (#792)
Automatically generated security fix

Co-authored-by: orbisai0security <orbisai0security@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-07 12:53:45 +05:30
38 changed files with 1083 additions and 123 deletions

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
1. First, fetch the list of labels available in this repository by running: `gh label list`. Run exactly this command with nothing else.
2. Next, use gh commands to get context about the issue:
- Use `gh issue view ${{ github.event.issue.number }}` to retrieve the current issue's details
- Use `gh search issues` to find similar issues that might provide context for proper categorization
- You have access to these Bash commands:
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
- Bash(gh search:\*) - to search for similar issues
3. Analyze the issue content, considering:
- The issue title and description
- The type of issue (bug report, feature request, question, etc.)
- Technical areas mentioned
@@ -36,7 +34,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
- Components affected
4. Select appropriate labels from the available labels list provided above:
- Choose labels that accurately reflect the issue's nature
- Be specific but comprehensive
- IMPORTANT: Add a priority label (P1, P2, or P3) based on the label descriptions from gh label list

View File

@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@ jobs:
prompt: "/label-issue REPO: ${{ github.repository }} ISSUE_NUMBER${{ github.event.issue.number }}"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
allowed_non_write_users: "*" # Required for issue triage workflow, if users without repo write access create issues
bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment: true # Required when using wildcard
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ inputs:
description: "The prefix to use for Claude branches (defaults to 'claude/', use 'claude-' for dash format)"
required: false
default: "claude/"
branch_name_template:
description: "Template for branch naming. Available variables: {{prefix}}, {{entityType}}, {{entityNumber}}, {{timestamp}}, {{sha}}, {{label}}, {{description}}. {{label}} will be first label from the issue/PR, or {{entityType}} as a fallback. {{description}} will be the first 5 words of the issue/PR title in kebab-case. Default: '{{prefix}}{{entityType}}-{{entityNumber}}-{{timestamp}}'"
required: false
default: ""
allowed_bots:
description: "Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots."
required: false
@@ -31,6 +35,10 @@ inputs:
description: "Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '*' to allow all users. Only works when github_token input is provided. WARNING: Use with extreme caution - this bypasses security checks and should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions (e.g., issue labeling)."
required: false
default: ""
bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment:
description: "REQUIRED when using allowed_non_write_users='*'. Set to 'true' to explicitly acknowledge the security implications of bypassing write permission checks for all users. This flag serves as a safeguard against accidental security misconfigurations."
required: false
default: "false"
# Claude Code configuration
prompt:
@@ -178,9 +186,11 @@ runs:
LABEL_TRIGGER: ${{ inputs.label_trigger }}
BASE_BRANCH: ${{ inputs.base_branch }}
BRANCH_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.branch_prefix }}
BRANCH_NAME_TEMPLATE: ${{ inputs.branch_name_template }}
OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github_token }}
ALLOWED_BOTS: ${{ inputs.allowed_bots }}
ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users }}
BYPASS_WRITE_PERMISSION_CHECK_ACKNOWLEDGMENT: ${{ inputs.bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment }}
GITHUB_RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
USE_STICKY_COMMENT: ${{ inputs.use_sticky_comment }}
DEFAULT_WORKFLOW_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
@@ -208,7 +218,7 @@ runs:
# Install Claude Code if no custom executable is provided
if [ -z "$PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE" ]; then
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.0.76"
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.6"
echo "Installing Claude Code v${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}..."
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
echo "Installation attempt $attempt..."

View File

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ Thank you for your interest in contributing to Claude Code Base Action! This doc
```
This script:
- Installs `act` if not present (requires Homebrew on macOS)
- Runs the GitHub Action workflow locally using Docker
- Requires your `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` to be set

View File

@@ -85,26 +85,26 @@ Add the following to your workflow file:
## Inputs
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| `show_full_output` | Show full JSON output (⚠️ May expose secrets - see [security docs](../docs/security.md#-full-output-security-warning)) | No | 'false'\*\* |
\*Either `prompt` or `prompt_file` must be provided, but not both.
@@ -490,7 +490,6 @@ This example shows how to use OIDC authentication with GCP Vertex AI:
To securely use your Anthropic API key:
1. Add your API key as a repository secret:
- Go to your repository's Settings
- Navigate to "Secrets and variables" → "Actions"
- Click "New repository secret"

View File

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ runs:
PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE: ${{ inputs.path_to_claude_code_executable }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE" ]; then
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.0.76"
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.6"
echo "Installing Claude Code v${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}..."
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
echo "Installation attempt $attempt..."

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-base-action",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.1.76",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.6",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3",
},
"devDependencies": {
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/io@1.1.3", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.1.76", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.33.5" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.24.1 || ^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-s7RvpXoFaLXLG7A1cJBAPD8ilwOhhc/12fb5mJXRuD561o4FmPtQ+WRfuy9akMmrFRfLsKv8Ornw3ClGAPL2fw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.2.6", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.33.5" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-lwswHo6z/Kh9djafk2ajPju62+VqHwJ23gueG1alfaLNK4GRYHgCROfiX6/wlxAd8sRvgTo6ry1hNzkyz7bOpw=="],
"@fastify/busboy": ["@fastify/busboy@2.1.1", "", {}, "sha512-vBZP4NlzfOlerQTnba4aqZoMhE/a9HY7HRqoOPaETQcSQuWEIyZMHGfVu6w9wGtGK5fED5qRs2DteVCjOH60sA=="],

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.1.76",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.6",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3"
},
"devDependencies": {

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
"name": "mcp-test",
"version": "1.0.0",
"dependencies": {
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0"
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.24.0"
}
}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.1.76",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.6",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/io@1.1.3", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.1.76", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.33.5" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.24.1 || ^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-s7RvpXoFaLXLG7A1cJBAPD8ilwOhhc/12fb5mJXRuD561o4FmPtQ+WRfuy9akMmrFRfLsKv8Ornw3ClGAPL2fw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.2.6", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.33.5", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.33.5" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-lwswHo6z/Kh9djafk2ajPju62+VqHwJ23gueG1alfaLNK4GRYHgCROfiX6/wlxAd8sRvgTo6ry1hNzkyz7bOpw=="],
"@fastify/busboy": ["@fastify/busboy@2.1.1", "", {}, "sha512-vBZP4NlzfOlerQTnba4aqZoMhE/a9HY7HRqoOPaETQcSQuWEIyZMHGfVu6w9wGtGK5fED5qRs2DteVCjOH60sA=="],

View File

@@ -116,7 +116,6 @@ The `additional_permissions` input allows Claude to access GitHub Actions workfl
To allow Claude to view workflow run results, job logs, and CI status:
1. **Grant the necessary permission to your GitHub token**:
- When using the default `GITHUB_TOKEN`, add the `actions: read` permission to your workflow:
```yaml

View File

@@ -228,12 +228,10 @@ jobs:
The action now automatically detects the appropriate mode:
1. **If `prompt` is provided** → Runs in **automation mode**
- Executes immediately without waiting for @claude mentions
- Perfect for scheduled tasks, PR automation, etc.
2. **If no `prompt` but @claude is mentioned** → Runs in **interactive mode**
- Waits for and responds to @claude mentions
- Creates tracking comments with progress

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
- **⚠️ Non-Write User Access (RISKY)**: The `allowed_non_write_users` parameter allows bypassing the write permission requirement. **This is a significant security risk and should only be used for workflows with extremely limited permissions** (e.g., issue labeling workflows that only have `issues: write` permission). This feature:
- Only works when `github_token` is provided as input (not with GitHub App authentication)
- Accepts either a comma-separated list of specific usernames or `*` to allow all users
- **When using the wildcard (`*`)**, you MUST also set `bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment: true` to explicitly acknowledge the security implications. Without this flag, the action will fail as a safeguard against accidental security misconfigurations
- **Should be used with extreme caution** as it bypasses the primary security mechanism of this action
- Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope
- **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in
@@ -75,14 +76,12 @@ Commits will show as verified and attributed to the GitHub account that owns the
```
2. Add the **public key** to your GitHub account:
- Go to GitHub → Settings → SSH and GPG keys
- Click "New SSH key"
- Select **Key type: Signing Key** (important)
- Paste the contents of `~/.ssh/signing_key.pub`
3. Add the **private key** to your repository secrets:
- Go to your repo → Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions
- Create a new secret named `SSH_SIGNING_KEY`
- Paste the contents of `~/.ssh/signing_key`

View File

@@ -31,27 +31,23 @@ The fastest way to create a custom GitHub App is using our pre-configured manife
**🚀 [Download the Quick Setup Tool](./create-app.html)** (Right-click → "Save Link As" or "Download Linked File")
After downloading, open `create-app.html` in your web browser:
- **For Personal Accounts:** Click the "Create App for Personal Account" button
- **For Organizations:** Enter your organization name and click "Create App for Organization"
The tool will automatically configure all required permissions and submit the manifest.
Alternatively, you can use the manifest file directly:
- Use the [`github-app-manifest.json`](../github-app-manifest.json) file from this repository
- Visit https://github.com/settings/apps/new (for personal) or your organization's app settings
- Look for the "Create from manifest" option and paste the JSON content
2. **Complete the creation flow:**
- GitHub will show you a preview of the app configuration
- Confirm the app name (you can customize it)
- Click "Create GitHub App"
- The app will be created with all required permissions automatically configured
3. **Generate and download a private key:**
- After creating the app, you'll be redirected to the app settings
- Scroll down to "Private keys"
- Click "Generate a private key"
@@ -64,7 +60,6 @@ The fastest way to create a custom GitHub App is using our pre-configured manife
If you prefer to configure the app manually or need custom permissions:
1. **Create a new GitHub App:**
- Go to https://github.com/settings/apps (for personal apps) or your organization's settings
- Click "New GitHub App"
- Configure the app with these minimum permissions:
@@ -77,19 +72,16 @@ If you prefer to configure the app manually or need custom permissions:
- Create the app
2. **Generate and download a private key:**
- After creating the app, scroll down to "Private keys"
- Click "Generate a private key"
- Download the `.pem` file (keep this secure!)
3. **Install the app on your repository:**
- Go to the app's settings page
- Click "Install App"
- Select the repositories where you want to use Claude
4. **Add the app credentials to your repository secrets:**
- Go to your repository's Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions
- Add these secrets:
- `APP_ID`: Your GitHub App's ID (found in the app settings)
@@ -138,7 +130,6 @@ For more information on creating GitHub Apps, see the [GitHub documentation](htt
To securely use your Anthropic API key:
1. Add your API key as a repository secret:
- Go to your repository's Settings
- Navigate to "Secrets and variables" → "Actions"
- Click "New repository secret"

View File

@@ -52,35 +52,36 @@ jobs:
## Inputs
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------- |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct API, not needed for Bedrock/Vertex) | No\* | - |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No\* | - |
| `prompt` | Instructions for Claude. Can be a direct prompt or custom template for automation workflows | No | - |
| `track_progress` | Force tag mode with tracking comments. Only works with specific PR/issue events. Preserves GitHub context | No | `false` |
| `include_fix_links` | Include 'Fix this' links in PR code review feedback that open Claude Code with context to fix the identified issue | No | `true` |
| `claude_args` | Additional [arguments to pass directly to Claude CLI](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference#cli-flags) (e.g., `--max-turns 10 --model claude-4-0-sonnet-20250805`) | No | "" |
| `base_branch` | The base branch to use for creating new branches (e.g., 'main', 'develop') | No | - |
| `use_sticky_comment` | Use just one comment to deliver PR comments (only applies for pull_request event workflows) | No | `false` |
| `github_token` | GitHub token for Claude to operate with. **Only include this if you're connecting a custom GitHub app of your own!** | No | - |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `assignee_trigger` | The assignee username that triggers the action (e.g. @claude). Only used for issue assignment | No | - |
| `label_trigger` | The label name that triggers the action when applied to an issue (e.g. "claude") | No | - |
| `trigger_phrase` | The trigger phrase to look for in comments, issue/PR bodies, and issue titles | No | `@claude` |
| `branch_prefix` | The prefix to use for Claude branches (defaults to 'claude/', use 'claude-' for dash format) | No | `claude/` |
| `settings` | Claude Code settings as JSON string or path to settings JSON file | No | "" |
| `additional_permissions` | Additional permissions to enable. Currently supports 'actions: read' for viewing workflow results | No | "" |
| `use_commit_signing` | Enable commit signing using GitHub's API. Simple but cannot perform complex git operations like rebasing. See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | `false` |
| `ssh_signing_key` | SSH private key for signing commits. Enables signed commits with full git CLI support (rebasing, etc.). See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | "" |
| `bot_id` | GitHub user ID to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot ID). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `41898282` |
| `bot_name` | GitHub username to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot name). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `claude[bot]` |
| `allowed_bots` | Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '\*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots | No | "" |
| `allowed_non_write_users` | **⚠️ RISKY**: Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '\*' for all users. Only works with `github_token` input. See [Security](./security.md) | No | "" |
| `path_to_claude_code_executable` | Optional path to a custom Claude Code executable. Skips automatic installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `path_to_bun_executable` | Optional path to a custom Bun executable. Skips automatic Bun installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `plugin_marketplaces` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin marketplace Git URLs to install from (e.g., see example in workflow above). Marketplaces are added before plugin installation | No | "" |
| `plugins` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin names to install (e.g., see example in workflow above). Plugins are installed before Claude Code execution | No | "" |
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------- |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct API, not needed for Bedrock/Vertex) | No\* | - |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No\* | - |
| `prompt` | Instructions for Claude. Can be a direct prompt or custom template for automation workflows | No | - |
| `track_progress` | Force tag mode with tracking comments. Only works with specific PR/issue events. Preserves GitHub context | No | `false` |
| `include_fix_links` | Include 'Fix this' links in PR code review feedback that open Claude Code with context to fix the identified issue | No | `true` |
| `claude_args` | Additional [arguments to pass directly to Claude CLI](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference#cli-flags) (e.g., `--max-turns 10 --model claude-4-0-sonnet-20250805`) | No | "" |
| `base_branch` | The base branch to use for creating new branches (e.g., 'main', 'develop') | No | - |
| `use_sticky_comment` | Use just one comment to deliver PR comments (only applies for pull_request event workflows) | No | `false` |
| `github_token` | GitHub token for Claude to operate with. **Only include this if you're connecting a custom GitHub app of your own!** | No | - |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `assignee_trigger` | The assignee username that triggers the action (e.g. @claude). Only used for issue assignment | No | - |
| `label_trigger` | The label name that triggers the action when applied to an issue (e.g. "claude") | No | - |
| `trigger_phrase` | The trigger phrase to look for in comments, issue/PR bodies, and issue titles | No | `@claude` |
| `branch_prefix` | The prefix to use for Claude branches (defaults to 'claude/', use 'claude-' for dash format) | No | `claude/` |
| `settings` | Claude Code settings as JSON string or path to settings JSON file | No | "" |
| `additional_permissions` | Additional permissions to enable. Currently supports 'actions: read' for viewing workflow results | No | "" |
| `use_commit_signing` | Enable commit signing using GitHub's API. Simple but cannot perform complex git operations like rebasing. See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | `false` |
| `ssh_signing_key` | SSH private key for signing commits. Enables signed commits with full git CLI support (rebasing, etc.). See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | "" |
| `bot_id` | GitHub user ID to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot ID). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `41898282` |
| `bot_name` | GitHub username to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot name). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `claude[bot]` |
| `allowed_bots` | Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '\*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots | No | "" |
| `allowed_non_write_users` | **⚠️ RISKY**: Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '\*' for all users. Only works with `github_token` input. See [Security](./security.md) | No | "" |
| `bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment` | **REQUIRED** when using `allowed_non_write_users='*'`. Set to `true` to explicitly acknowledge security implications. Prevents accidental security misconfigurations | No | `false` |
| `path_to_claude_code_executable` | Optional path to a custom Claude Code executable. Skips automatic installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `path_to_bun_executable` | Optional path to a custom Bun executable. Skips automatic Bun installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `plugin_marketplaces` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin marketplace Git URLs to install from (e.g., see example in workflow above). Marketplaces are added before plugin installation | No | "" |
| `plugins` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin names to install (e.g., see example in workflow above). Plugins are installed before Claude Code execution | No | "" |
### Deprecated Inputs

View File

@@ -26,4 +26,5 @@ jobs:
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
allowed_non_write_users: "*" # Required for issue triage workflow, if users without repo write access create issues
bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment: true # Required when using wildcard
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.1.76",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.6",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ async function run() {
context,
context.inputs.allowedNonWriteUsers,
githubTokenProvided,
context.inputs.bypassWritePermissionCheckAcknowledgment,
);
if (!hasWritePermissions) {
throw new Error(

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ export const PR_QUERY = `
additions
deletions
state
labels(first: 1) {
nodes {
name
}
}
commits(first: 100) {
totalCount
nodes {
@@ -101,6 +106,11 @@ export const ISSUE_QUERY = `
updatedAt
lastEditedAt
state
labels(first: 1) {
nodes {
name
}
}
comments(first: 100) {
nodes {
id

View File

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ type BaseContext = {
labelTrigger: string;
baseBranch?: string;
branchPrefix: string;
branchNameTemplate?: string;
useStickyComment: boolean;
useCommitSigning: boolean;
sshSigningKey: string;
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ type BaseContext = {
botName: string;
allowedBots: string;
allowedNonWriteUsers: string;
bypassWritePermissionCheckAcknowledgment: boolean;
trackProgress: boolean;
includeFixLinks: boolean;
};
@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ export function parseGitHubContext(): GitHubContext {
labelTrigger: process.env.LABEL_TRIGGER ?? "",
baseBranch: process.env.BASE_BRANCH,
branchPrefix: process.env.BRANCH_PREFIX ?? "claude/",
branchNameTemplate: process.env.BRANCH_NAME_TEMPLATE,
useStickyComment: process.env.USE_STICKY_COMMENT === "true",
useCommitSigning: process.env.USE_COMMIT_SIGNING === "true",
sshSigningKey: process.env.SSH_SIGNING_KEY || "",
@@ -152,6 +155,8 @@ export function parseGitHubContext(): GitHubContext {
botName: process.env.BOT_NAME ?? CLAUDE_BOT_LOGIN,
allowedBots: process.env.ALLOWED_BOTS ?? "",
allowedNonWriteUsers: process.env.ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS ?? "",
bypassWritePermissionCheckAcknowledgment:
process.env.BYPASS_WRITE_PERMISSION_CHECK_ACKNOWLEDGMENT === "true",
trackProgress: process.env.TRACK_PROGRESS === "true",
includeFixLinks: process.env.INCLUDE_FIX_LINKS === "true",
},

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import type { Octokits } from "../api/client";
import { ISSUE_QUERY, PR_QUERY, USER_QUERY } from "../api/queries/github";
import {
isIssueCommentEvent,
isIssuesEvent,
isPullRequestEvent,
isPullRequestReviewEvent,
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
type ParsedGitHubContext,
@@ -40,6 +42,31 @@ export function extractTriggerTimestamp(
return undefined;
}
/**
* Extracts the original title from the GitHub webhook payload.
* This is the title as it existed when the trigger event occurred.
*
* @param context - Parsed GitHub context from webhook
* @returns The original title string or undefined if not available
*/
export function extractOriginalTitle(
context: ParsedGitHubContext,
): string | undefined {
if (isIssueCommentEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.issue?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isIssuesEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.issue?.title;
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Filters comments to only include those that existed in their final state before the trigger time.
* This prevents malicious actors from editing comments after the trigger to inject harmful content.
@@ -146,6 +173,7 @@ type FetchDataParams = {
isPR: boolean;
triggerUsername?: string;
triggerTime?: string;
originalTitle?: string;
};
export type GitHubFileWithSHA = GitHubFile & {
@@ -169,6 +197,7 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
isPR,
triggerUsername,
triggerTime,
originalTitle,
}: FetchDataParams): Promise<FetchDataResult> {
const [owner, repo] = repository.split("/");
if (!owner || !repo) {
@@ -354,6 +383,11 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
triggerDisplayName = await fetchUserDisplayName(octokits, triggerUsername);
}
// Use the original title from the webhook payload if provided
if (originalTitle !== undefined) {
contextData.title = originalTitle;
}
return {
contextData,
comments,

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ export function formatContext(
): string {
if (isPR) {
const prData = contextData as GitHubPullRequest;
return `PR Title: ${prData.title}
const sanitizedTitle = sanitizeContent(prData.title);
return `PR Title: ${sanitizedTitle}
PR Author: ${prData.author.login}
PR Branch: ${prData.headRefName} -> ${prData.baseRefName}
PR State: ${prData.state}
@@ -24,7 +25,8 @@ Total Commits: ${prData.commits.totalCount}
Changed Files: ${prData.files.nodes.length} files`;
} else {
const issueData = contextData as GitHubIssue;
return `Issue Title: ${issueData.title}
const sanitizedTitle = sanitizeContent(issueData.title);
return `Issue Title: ${sanitizedTitle}
Issue Author: ${issueData.author.login}
Issue State: ${issueData.state}`;
}

View File

@@ -6,12 +6,22 @@
* - For Issues: Create a new branch
*/
import { $ } from "bun";
import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import type { ParsedGitHubContext } from "../context";
import type { GitHubPullRequest } from "../types";
import type { Octokits } from "../api/client";
import type { FetchDataResult } from "../data/fetcher";
import { generateBranchName } from "../../utils/branch-template";
/**
* Extracts the first label from GitHub data, or returns undefined if no labels exist
*/
function extractFirstLabel(githubData: FetchDataResult): string | undefined {
const labels = githubData.contextData.labels?.nodes;
return labels && labels.length > 0 ? labels[0]?.name : undefined;
}
/**
* Validates a git branch name against a strict whitelist pattern.
@@ -125,7 +135,7 @@ export async function setupBranch(
): Promise<BranchInfo> {
const { owner, repo } = context.repository;
const entityNumber = context.entityNumber;
const { baseBranch, branchPrefix } = context.inputs;
const { baseBranch, branchPrefix, branchNameTemplate } = context.inputs;
const isPR = context.isPR;
if (isPR) {
@@ -191,17 +201,8 @@ export async function setupBranch(
// Generate branch name for either an issue or closed/merged PR
const entityType = isPR ? "pr" : "issue";
// Create Kubernetes-compatible timestamp: lowercase, hyphens only, shorter format
const now = new Date();
const timestamp = `${now.getFullYear()}${String(now.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0")}${String(now.getDate()).padStart(2, "0")}-${String(now.getHours()).padStart(2, "0")}${String(now.getMinutes()).padStart(2, "0")}`;
// Ensure branch name is Kubernetes-compatible:
// - Lowercase only
// - Alphanumeric with hyphens
// - No underscores
// - Max 50 chars (to allow for prefixes)
const branchName = `${branchPrefix}${entityType}-${entityNumber}-${timestamp}`;
const newBranch = branchName.toLowerCase().substring(0, 50);
// Get the SHA of the source branch to use in template
let sourceSHA: string | undefined;
try {
// Get the SHA of the source branch to verify it exists
@@ -211,8 +212,46 @@ export async function setupBranch(
ref: `heads/${sourceBranch}`,
});
const currentSHA = sourceBranchRef.data.object.sha;
console.log(`Source branch SHA: ${currentSHA}`);
sourceSHA = sourceBranchRef.data.object.sha;
console.log(`Source branch SHA: ${sourceSHA}`);
// Extract first label from GitHub data
const firstLabel = extractFirstLabel(githubData);
// Extract title from GitHub data
const title = githubData.contextData.title;
// Generate branch name using template or default format
let newBranch = generateBranchName(
branchNameTemplate,
branchPrefix,
entityType,
entityNumber,
sourceSHA,
firstLabel,
title,
);
// Check if generated branch already exists on remote
try {
await $`git ls-remote --exit-code origin refs/heads/${newBranch}`.quiet();
// If we get here, branch exists (exit code 0)
console.log(
`Branch '${newBranch}' already exists, falling back to default format`,
);
newBranch = generateBranchName(
undefined, // Force default template
branchPrefix,
entityType,
entityNumber,
sourceSHA,
firstLabel,
title,
);
} catch {
// Branch doesn't exist (non-zero exit code), continue with generated name
}
// For commit signing, defer branch creation to the file ops server
if (context.inputs.useCommitSigning) {

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ export type GitHubPullRequest = {
additions: number;
deletions: number;
state: string;
labels: {
nodes: Array<{
name: string;
}>;
};
commits: {
totalCount: number;
nodes: Array<{
@@ -88,6 +93,11 @@ export type GitHubIssue = {
updatedAt?: string;
lastEditedAt?: string;
state: string;
labels: {
nodes: Array<{
name: string;
}>;
};
comments: {
nodes: GitHubComment[];
};

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import type { Octokit } from "@octokit/rest";
* @param context - The GitHub context
* @param allowedNonWriteUsers - Comma-separated list of users allowed without write permissions, or '*' for all
* @param githubTokenProvided - Whether github_token was provided as input (not from app)
* @param bypassAcknowledgment - Explicit acknowledgment required when using wildcard (*)
* @returns true if the actor has write permissions, false otherwise
*/
export async function checkWritePermissions(
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ export async function checkWritePermissions(
context: ParsedGitHubContext,
allowedNonWriteUsers?: string,
githubTokenProvided?: boolean,
bypassAcknowledgment?: boolean,
): Promise<boolean> {
const { repository, actor } = context;
@@ -25,6 +27,17 @@ export async function checkWritePermissions(
if (allowedNonWriteUsers && githubTokenProvided) {
const allowedUsers = allowedNonWriteUsers.trim();
if (allowedUsers === "*") {
if (!bypassAcknowledgment) {
core.error(
`❌ SECURITY ERROR: Attempting to bypass write permission checks for all users with allowed_non_write_users='*' without explicit acknowledgment. ` +
`This is a critical security misconfiguration. To proceed, you must set bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment='true' ` +
`to explicitly acknowledge the security implications.`,
);
throw new Error(
"Cannot bypass write permission checks with wildcard (*) without explicit acknowledgment. " +
"Set bypass_write_permission_check_acknowledgment='true' to acknowledge security implications.",
);
}
core.warning(
`⚠️ SECURITY WARNING: Bypassing write permission check for ${actor} due to allowed_non_write_users='*'. This should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions.`,
);

View File

@@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { z } from "zod";
import { readFile, stat } from "fs/promises";
import { join } from "path";
import { resolve } from "path";
import { constants } from "fs";
import fetch from "node-fetch";
import { GITHUB_API_URL } from "../github/api/config";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../utils/retry";
import { validatePathWithinRepo } from "./path-validation";
type GitHubRef = {
object: {
@@ -213,12 +214,18 @@ server.tool(
throw new Error("GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable is required");
}
const processedFiles = files.map((filePath) => {
if (filePath.startsWith("/")) {
return filePath.slice(1);
}
return filePath;
});
// Validate all paths are within repository root and get full/relative paths
const resolvedRepoDir = resolve(REPO_DIR);
const validatedFiles = await Promise.all(
files.map(async (filePath) => {
const fullPath = await validatePathWithinRepo(filePath, REPO_DIR);
// Calculate the relative path for the git tree entry
// Use the original filePath (normalized) for the git path, not the symlink-resolved path
const normalizedPath = resolve(resolvedRepoDir, filePath);
const relativePath = normalizedPath.slice(resolvedRepoDir.length + 1);
return { fullPath, relativePath };
}),
);
// 1. Get the branch reference (create if doesn't exist)
const baseSha = await getOrCreateBranchRef(
@@ -247,18 +254,14 @@ server.tool(
// 3. Create tree entries for all files
const treeEntries = await Promise.all(
processedFiles.map(async (filePath) => {
const fullPath = filePath.startsWith("/")
? filePath
: join(REPO_DIR, filePath);
validatedFiles.map(async ({ fullPath, relativePath }) => {
// Get the proper file mode based on file permissions
const fileMode = await getFileMode(fullPath);
// Check if file is binary (images, etc.)
const isBinaryFile =
/\.(png|jpg|jpeg|gif|webp|ico|pdf|zip|tar|gz|exe|bin|woff|woff2|ttf|eot)$/i.test(
filePath,
relativePath,
);
if (isBinaryFile) {
@@ -284,7 +287,7 @@ server.tool(
if (!blobResponse.ok) {
const errorText = await blobResponse.text();
throw new Error(
`Failed to create blob for ${filePath}: ${blobResponse.status} - ${errorText}`,
`Failed to create blob for ${relativePath}: ${blobResponse.status} - ${errorText}`,
);
}
@@ -292,7 +295,7 @@ server.tool(
// Return tree entry with blob SHA
return {
path: filePath,
path: relativePath,
mode: fileMode,
type: "blob",
sha: blobData.sha,
@@ -301,7 +304,7 @@ server.tool(
// For text files, include content directly in tree
const content = await readFile(fullPath, "utf-8");
return {
path: filePath,
path: relativePath,
mode: fileMode,
type: "blob",
content: content,
@@ -421,7 +424,9 @@ server.tool(
author: newCommitData.author.name,
date: newCommitData.author.date,
},
files: processedFiles.map((path) => ({ path })),
files: validatedFiles.map(({ relativePath }) => ({
path: relativePath,
})),
tree: {
sha: treeData.sha,
},

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
import { realpath } from "fs/promises";
import { resolve, sep } from "path";
/**
* Validates that a file path resolves within the repository root.
* Prevents path traversal attacks via "../" sequences and symlinks.
* @param filePath - The file path to validate (can be relative or absolute)
* @param repoRoot - The repository root directory
* @returns The resolved absolute path (with symlinks resolved) if valid
* @throws Error if the path resolves outside the repository root
*/
export async function validatePathWithinRepo(
filePath: string,
repoRoot: string,
): Promise<string> {
// First resolve the path string (handles .. and . segments)
const initialPath = resolve(repoRoot, filePath);
// Resolve symlinks to get the real path
// This prevents symlink attacks where a link inside the repo points outside
let resolvedRoot: string;
let resolvedPath: string;
try {
resolvedRoot = await realpath(repoRoot);
} catch {
throw new Error(`Repository root '${repoRoot}' does not exist`);
}
try {
resolvedPath = await realpath(initialPath);
} catch {
// File doesn't exist yet - fall back to checking the parent directory
// This handles the case where we're creating a new file
const parentDir = resolve(initialPath, "..");
try {
const resolvedParent = await realpath(parentDir);
if (
resolvedParent !== resolvedRoot &&
!resolvedParent.startsWith(resolvedRoot + sep)
) {
throw new Error(
`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`,
);
}
// Parent is valid, return the initial path since file doesn't exist yet
return initialPath;
} catch {
throw new Error(
`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`,
);
}
}
// Path must be within repo root (or be the root itself)
if (
resolvedPath !== resolvedRoot &&
!resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedRoot + sep)
) {
throw new Error(`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`);
}
return resolvedPath;
}

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,33 @@
export function parseAllowedTools(claudeArgs: string): string[] {
// Match --allowedTools or --allowed-tools followed by the value
// Handle both quoted and unquoted values
// Use /g flag to find ALL occurrences, not just the first one
const patterns = [
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+"([^"]+)"/, // Double quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+'([^']+)'/, // Single quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+([^\s]+)/, // Unquoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+"([^"]+)"/g, // Double quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+'([^']+)'/g, // Single quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+([^'"\s][^\s]*)/g, // Unquoted (must not start with quote)
];
const tools: string[] = [];
const seen = new Set<string>();
for (const pattern of patterns) {
const match = claudeArgs.match(pattern);
if (match && match[1]) {
// Don't return if the value starts with -- (another flag)
if (match[1].startsWith("--")) {
return [];
for (const match of claudeArgs.matchAll(pattern)) {
if (match[1]) {
// Don't add if the value starts with -- (another flag)
if (match[1].startsWith("--")) {
continue;
}
for (const tool of match[1].split(",")) {
const trimmed = tool.trim();
if (trimmed && !seen.has(trimmed)) {
seen.add(trimmed);
tools.push(trimmed);
}
}
}
return match[1].split(",").map((t) => t.trim());
}
}
return [];
return tools;
}

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { prepareMcpConfig } from "../../mcp/install-mcp-server";
import {
fetchGitHubData,
extractTriggerTimestamp,
extractOriginalTitle,
} from "../../github/data/fetcher";
import { createPrompt, generateDefaultPrompt } from "../../create-prompt";
import { isEntityContext } from "../../github/context";
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ export const tagMode: Mode = {
const commentId = commentData.id;
const triggerTime = extractTriggerTimestamp(context);
const originalTitle = extractOriginalTitle(context);
const githubData = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: octokit,
@@ -86,6 +88,7 @@ export const tagMode: Mode = {
isPR: context.isPR,
triggerUsername: context.actor,
triggerTime,
originalTitle,
});
// Setup branch

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bun
/**
* Branch name template parsing and variable substitution utilities
*/
const NUM_DESCRIPTION_WORDS = 5;
/**
* Extracts the first 5 words from a title and converts them to kebab-case
*/
function extractDescription(
title: string,
numWords: number = NUM_DESCRIPTION_WORDS,
): string {
if (!title || title.trim() === "") {
return "";
}
return title
.trim()
.split(/\s+/)
.slice(0, numWords) // Only first `numWords` words
.join("-")
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/g, "") // Remove non-alphanumeric except hyphens
.replace(/-+/g, "-") // Replace multiple hyphens with single
.replace(/^-|-$/g, ""); // Remove leading/trailing hyphens
}
export interface BranchTemplateVariables {
prefix: string;
entityType: string;
entityNumber: number;
timestamp: string;
sha?: string;
label?: string;
description?: string;
}
/**
* Replaces template variables in a branch name template
* Template format: {{variableName}}
*/
export function applyBranchTemplate(
template: string,
variables: BranchTemplateVariables,
): string {
let result = template;
// Replace each variable
Object.entries(variables).forEach(([key, value]) => {
const placeholder = `{{${key}}}`;
const replacement = value ? String(value) : "";
result = result.replaceAll(placeholder, replacement);
});
return result;
}
/**
* Generates a branch name from the provided `template` and set of `variables`. Uses a default format if the template is empty or produces an empty result.
*/
export function generateBranchName(
template: string | undefined,
branchPrefix: string,
entityType: string,
entityNumber: number,
sha?: string,
label?: string,
title?: string,
): string {
const now = new Date();
const variables: BranchTemplateVariables = {
prefix: branchPrefix,
entityType,
entityNumber,
timestamp: `${now.getFullYear()}${String(now.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0")}${String(now.getDate()).padStart(2, "0")}-${String(now.getHours()).padStart(2, "0")}${String(now.getMinutes()).padStart(2, "0")}`,
sha: sha?.substring(0, 8), // First 8 characters of SHA
label: label || entityType, // Fall back to entityType if no label
description: title ? extractDescription(title) : undefined,
};
if (template?.trim()) {
const branchName = applyBranchTemplate(template, variables);
// Some templates could produce empty results- validate
if (branchName.trim().length > 0) return branchName;
console.log(
`Branch template '${template}' generated empty result, falling back to default format`,
);
}
const branchName = `${branchPrefix}${entityType}-${entityNumber}-${variables.timestamp}`;
// Kubernetes compatible: lowercase, max 50 chars, alphanumeric and hyphens only
return branchName.toLowerCase().substring(0, 50);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bun
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import {
applyBranchTemplate,
generateBranchName,
} from "../src/utils/branch-template";
describe("branch template utilities", () => {
describe("applyBranchTemplate", () => {
it("should replace all template variables", () => {
const template =
"{{prefix}}{{entityType}}-{{entityNumber}}-{{timestamp}}";
const variables = {
prefix: "feat/",
entityType: "issue",
entityNumber: 123,
timestamp: "20240301-1430",
sha: "abcd1234",
};
const result = applyBranchTemplate(template, variables);
expect(result).toBe("feat/issue-123-20240301-1430");
});
it("should handle custom templates with multiple variables", () => {
const template =
"{{prefix}}fix/{{entityType}}_{{entityNumber}}_{{timestamp}}_{{sha}}";
const variables = {
prefix: "claude-",
entityType: "pr",
entityNumber: 456,
timestamp: "20240301-1430",
sha: "abcd1234",
};
const result = applyBranchTemplate(template, variables);
expect(result).toBe("claude-fix/pr_456_20240301-1430_abcd1234");
});
it("should handle templates with missing variables gracefully", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{entityType}}-{{missing}}-{{entityNumber}}";
const variables = {
prefix: "feat/",
entityType: "issue",
entityNumber: 123,
timestamp: "20240301-1430",
};
const result = applyBranchTemplate(template, variables);
expect(result).toBe("feat/issue-{{missing}}-123");
});
});
describe("generateBranchName", () => {
it("should use custom template when provided", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}custom-{{entityType}}_{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(template, "feature/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toBe("feature/custom-issue_123");
});
it("should use default format when template is empty", () => {
const result = generateBranchName("", "claude/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toMatch(/^claude\/issue-123-\d{8}-\d{4}$/);
});
it("should use default format when template is undefined", () => {
const result = generateBranchName(undefined, "claude/", "pr", 456);
expect(result).toMatch(/^claude\/pr-456-\d{8}-\d{4}$/);
});
it("should preserve custom template formatting (no automatic lowercase/truncation)", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}UPPERCASE_Branch-Name_{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(template, "Feature/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toBe("Feature/UPPERCASE_Branch-Name_123");
});
it("should not truncate custom template results", () => {
const template =
"{{prefix}}very-long-branch-name-that-exceeds-the-maximum-allowed-length-{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(template, "feature/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toBe(
"feature/very-long-branch-name-that-exceeds-the-maximum-allowed-length-123",
);
});
it("should apply Kubernetes-compatible transformations to default template only", () => {
const result = generateBranchName(undefined, "Feature/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toMatch(/^feature\/issue-123-\d{8}-\d{4}$/);
expect(result.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
});
it("should handle SHA in template", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{entityType}}-{{entityNumber}}-{{sha}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"fix/",
"pr",
789,
"abcdef123456",
);
expect(result).toBe("fix/pr-789-abcdef12");
});
it("should use label in template when provided", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{label}}/{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"feature/",
"issue",
123,
undefined,
"bug",
);
expect(result).toBe("feature/bug/123");
});
it("should fallback to entityType when label template is used but no label provided", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{label}}-{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(template, "fix/", "pr", 456);
expect(result).toBe("fix/pr-456");
});
it("should handle template with both label and entityType", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{label}}-{{entityType}}_{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"dev/",
"issue",
789,
undefined,
"enhancement",
);
expect(result).toBe("dev/enhancement-issue_789");
});
it("should use description in template when provided", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{description}}/{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"feature/",
"issue",
123,
undefined,
undefined,
"Fix login bug with OAuth",
);
expect(result).toBe("feature/fix-login-bug-with-oauth/123");
});
it("should handle template with multiple variables including description", () => {
const template =
"{{prefix}}{{label}}/{{description}}-{{entityType}}_{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"dev/",
"issue",
456,
undefined,
"bug",
"User authentication fails completely",
);
expect(result).toBe(
"dev/bug/user-authentication-fails-completely-issue_456",
);
});
it("should handle description with special characters in template", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{description}}-{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"fix/",
"pr",
789,
undefined,
undefined,
"Add: User Registration & Email Validation",
);
expect(result).toBe("fix/add-user-registration-email-789");
});
it("should truncate descriptions to exactly 5 words", () => {
const result = generateBranchName(
"{{prefix}}{{description}}/{{entityNumber}}",
"feature/",
"issue",
999,
undefined,
undefined,
"This is a very long title with many more than five words in it",
);
expect(result).toBe("feature/this-is-a-very-long/999");
});
it("should handle empty description in template", () => {
const template = "{{prefix}}{{description}}-{{entityNumber}}";
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"test/",
"issue",
101,
undefined,
undefined,
"",
);
expect(result).toBe("test/-101");
});
it("should fallback to default format when template produces empty result", () => {
const template = "{{description}}"; // Will be empty if no title provided
const result = generateBranchName(template, "claude/", "issue", 123);
expect(result).toMatch(/^claude\/issue-123-\d{8}-\d{4}$/);
expect(result.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
});
it("should fallback to default format when template produces only whitespace", () => {
const template = " {{description}} "; // Will be " " if description is empty
const result = generateBranchName(
template,
"fix/",
"pr",
456,
undefined,
undefined,
"",
);
expect(result).toMatch(/^fix\/pr-456-\d{8}-\d{4}$/);
expect(result.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
});
});
});

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
body: "This is a test PR",
author: { login: "testuser" },
state: "OPEN",
labels: { nodes: [] },
createdAt: "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
additions: 15,
deletions: 5,
@@ -475,6 +476,7 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
body: "The login form is not working",
author: { login: "testuser" },
state: "OPEN",
labels: { nodes: [] },
createdAt: "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
comments: {
nodes: [],

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { describe, expect, it, jest } from "bun:test";
import {
extractTriggerTimestamp,
extractOriginalTitle,
fetchGitHubData,
filterCommentsToTriggerTime,
filterReviewsToTriggerTime,
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ import {
import {
createMockContext,
mockIssueCommentContext,
mockPullRequestCommentContext,
mockPullRequestReviewContext,
mockPullRequestReviewCommentContext,
mockPullRequestOpenedContext,
@@ -63,6 +65,47 @@ describe("extractTriggerTimestamp", () => {
});
});
describe("extractOriginalTitle", () => {
it("should extract title from IssueCommentEvent on PR", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestCommentContext);
expect(title).toBe("Fix: Memory leak in user service");
});
it("should extract title from PullRequestReviewEvent", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestReviewContext);
expect(title).toBe("Refactor: Improve error handling in API layer");
});
it("should extract title from PullRequestReviewCommentEvent", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestReviewCommentContext);
expect(title).toBe("Performance: Optimize search algorithm");
});
it("should extract title from pull_request event", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestOpenedContext);
expect(title).toBe("Feature: Add user authentication");
});
it("should extract title from issues event", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockIssueOpenedContext);
expect(title).toBe("Bug: Application crashes on startup");
});
it("should return undefined for event without title", () => {
const context = createMockContext({
eventName: "issue_comment",
payload: {
comment: {
id: 123,
body: "test",
},
} as any,
});
const title = extractOriginalTitle(context);
expect(title).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe("filterCommentsToTriggerTime", () => {
const createMockComment = (
createdAt: string,
@@ -945,4 +988,115 @@ describe("fetchGitHubData integration with time filtering", () => {
);
expect(hasPrBodyInMap).toBe(false);
});
it("should use originalTitle when provided instead of fetched title", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Fetched Title From GraphQL",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
originalTitle: "Original Title From Webhook",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe("Original Title From Webhook");
});
it("should use fetched title when originalTitle is not provided", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Fetched Title From GraphQL",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe("Fetched Title From GraphQL");
});
it("should use original title from webhook even if title was edited after trigger", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Edited Title (from GraphQL)",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
lastEditedAt: "2024-01-15T12:30:00Z", // Edited after trigger
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
triggerTime: "2024-01-15T12:00:00Z",
originalTitle: "Original Title (from webhook at trigger time)",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe(
"Original Title (from webhook at trigger time)",
);
});
});

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ describe("formatContext", () => {
additions: 50,
deletions: 30,
state: "OPEN",
labels: {
nodes: [],
},
commits: {
totalCount: 3,
nodes: [],
@@ -63,6 +66,9 @@ Changed Files: 2 files`,
author: { login: "test-user" },
createdAt: "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
state: "OPEN",
labels: {
nodes: [],
},
comments: {
nodes: [],
},

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
import { describe, expect, it, beforeAll, afterAll } from "bun:test";
import { validatePathWithinRepo } from "../src/mcp/path-validation";
import { resolve } from "path";
import { mkdir, writeFile, symlink, rm, realpath } from "fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
describe("validatePathWithinRepo", () => {
// Use a real temp directory for tests that need filesystem access
let testDir: string;
let repoRoot: string;
let outsideDir: string;
// Real paths after symlink resolution (e.g., /tmp -> /private/tmp on macOS)
let realRepoRoot: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
// Create test directory structure
testDir = resolve(tmpdir(), `path-validation-test-${Date.now()}`);
repoRoot = resolve(testDir, "repo");
outsideDir = resolve(testDir, "outside");
await mkdir(repoRoot, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(resolve(repoRoot, "src"), { recursive: true });
await mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
// Create test files
await writeFile(resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt"), "inside repo");
await writeFile(resolve(repoRoot, "src", "main.js"), "console.log('hi')");
await writeFile(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), "sensitive data");
// Get real paths after symlink resolution
realRepoRoot = await realpath(repoRoot);
});
afterAll(async () => {
// Cleanup
await rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
describe("valid paths", () => {
it("should accept simple relative paths", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("file.txt", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept nested relative paths", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should accept paths with single dot segments", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("./src/main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should accept paths that use .. but resolve inside repo", async () => {
// src/../file.txt resolves to file.txt which is still inside repo
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/../file.txt", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept absolute paths within the repo root", async () => {
const absolutePath = resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt");
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo(absolutePath, repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept the repo root itself", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo(".", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(realRepoRoot);
});
it("should handle new files (non-existent) in valid directories", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/newfile.js", repoRoot);
// For non-existent files, we validate the parent but return the initial path
// (can't realpath a file that doesn't exist yet)
expect(result).toBe(resolve(repoRoot, "src/newfile.js"));
});
});
describe("path traversal attacks", () => {
it("should reject simple parent directory traversal", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("../outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject deeply nested parent directory traversal", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("../../../etc/passwd", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject traversal hidden within path", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("src/../../outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject traversal at the end of path", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("src/../..", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject absolute paths outside the repo root", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("/etc/passwd", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject absolute paths to sibling directories", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
});
describe("symlink attacks", () => {
it("should reject symlinks pointing outside the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink inside the repo that points to a file outside
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "evil-link");
await symlink(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), symlinkPath);
try {
// The symlink path looks like it's inside the repo, but points outside
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("evil-link", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should reject symlinks to parent directories", async () => {
// Create a symlink to the parent directory
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "parent-link");
await symlink(testDir, symlinkPath);
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("parent-link/outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should accept symlinks that resolve within the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink inside the repo that points to another file inside
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "good-link");
await symlink(resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt"), symlinkPath);
try {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("good-link", repoRoot);
// Should resolve to the actual file location
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should reject directory symlinks that escape the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink to outside directory
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "escape-dir");
await symlink(outsideDir, symlinkPath);
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("escape-dir/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
});
describe("edge cases", () => {
it("should handle empty path (current directory)", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(realRepoRoot);
});
it("should handle paths with multiple consecutive slashes", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src//main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should handle paths with trailing slashes", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src"));
});
it("should reject prefix attack (repo root as prefix but not parent)", async () => {
// Create a sibling directory with repo name as prefix
const evilDir = repoRoot + "-evil";
await mkdir(evilDir, { recursive: true });
await writeFile(resolve(evilDir, "file.txt"), "evil");
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo(resolve(evilDir, "file.txt"), repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(evilDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("should throw error for non-existent repo root", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("file.txt", "/nonexistent/repo"),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not exist/);
});
});
});

View File

@@ -35,12 +35,44 @@ describe("parseAllowedTools", () => {
expect(parseAllowedTools("")).toEqual([]);
});
test("handles duplicate --allowedTools flags", () => {
test("handles --allowedTools followed by another --allowedTools flag", () => {
const args = "--allowedTools --allowedTools mcp__github__*";
// Should not match the first one since the value is another flag
// The second --allowedTools is consumed as a value of the first, then skipped.
// This is an edge case with malformed input - returns empty.
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([]);
});
test("parses multiple separate --allowed-tools flags", () => {
const args =
"--allowed-tools 'mcp__context7__*' --allowed-tools 'Read,Glob' --allowed-tools 'mcp__github_inline_comment__*'";
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([
"mcp__context7__*",
"Read",
"Glob",
"mcp__github_inline_comment__*",
]);
});
test("parses multiple --allowed-tools flags on separate lines", () => {
const args = `--model 'claude-haiku'
--allowed-tools 'mcp__context7__*'
--allowed-tools 'Read,Glob,Grep'
--allowed-tools 'mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment'`;
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([
"mcp__context7__*",
"Read",
"Glob",
"Grep",
"mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment",
]);
});
test("deduplicates tools from multiple flags", () => {
const args =
"--allowed-tools 'Read,Glob' --allowed-tools 'Glob,Grep' --allowed-tools 'Read'";
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual(["Read", "Glob", "Grep"]);
});
test("handles typo --alloedTools", () => {
const args = "--alloedTools mcp__github__*";
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([]);

View File

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ describe("checkWritePermissions", () => {
botName: CLAUDE_BOT_LOGIN,
allowedBots: "",
allowedNonWriteUsers: "",
bypassWritePermissionCheckAcknowledgment: false,
trackProgress: false,
includeFixLinks: true,
},
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ describe("checkWritePermissions", () => {
);
});
test("should bypass permission check for all users with wildcard", async () => {
test("should bypass permission check for all users with wildcard when acknowledgment provided", async () => {
const mockOctokit = createMockOctokit("read");
const context = createContext();
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ describe("checkWritePermissions", () => {
context,
"*",
true,
true, // acknowledgment provided
);
expect(result).toBe(true);
@@ -214,6 +216,17 @@ describe("checkWritePermissions", () => {
);
});
test("should FAIL to bypass permission check with wildcard when acknowledgment NOT provided", async () => {
const mockOctokit = createMockOctokit("read");
const context = createContext();
await expect(
checkWritePermissions(mockOctokit, context, "*", true, false),
).rejects.toThrow(
"Cannot bypass write permission checks with wildcard (*) without explicit acknowledgment",
);
});
test("should NOT bypass permission check when user not in allowed list", async () => {
const mockOctokit = createMockOctokit("read");
const context = createContext();

View File

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ describe("pull_request_target event support", () => {
},
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
labels: { nodes: [] },
},
comments: [],
changedFiles: [],