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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude
d544d7303b chore: fix markdown formatting in documentation
Remove unnecessary blank lines after list items in markdown files.
2026-01-07 18:49:13 +00:00
Claude
5c0f1e2273 feat: add clawd-stop label check to CI auto-fix workflow
Skip auto-fix when the PR has a 'clawd-stop' label. This provides a
stop-gap mechanism to prevent the auto-fix from running on specific PRs.
2026-01-07 18:48:24 +00:00
David Dworken
5da7ba548c feat: add path validation for commit_files MCP tool (#796)
Add validatePathWithinRepo helper to ensure file paths resolve within the repository root directory. This hardens the commit_files tool by validating paths before file operations.

Changes:
- Add src/mcp/path-validation.ts with async path validation using realpath
- Update commit_files to validate all paths before reading files
- Prevent symlink-based path escapes by resolving real paths
- Add comprehensive test coverage including symlink attack scenarios

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-07 10:16:31 -08:00
Ashwin Bhat
964b8355fb fix: use original title from webhook payload instead of fetched title (#793)
* fix: use original title from webhook payload instead of fetched title

- Add extractOriginalTitle() helper to extract title from webhook payload
- Add originalTitle parameter to fetchGitHubData()
- Update tag mode to pass original title from webhook context
- Add tests for extractOriginalTitle and originalTitle parameter

This ensures the title used in prompts is the one that existed when the
trigger event occurred, rather than a potentially modified title fetched
later via GraphQL.

* fix: add title sanitization and explicit TOCTOU test

- Apply sanitizeContent() to titles in formatContext() for defense-in-depth
- Add explicit test documenting TOCTOU prevention for title handling
2026-01-07 23:45:12 +05:30
orbisai0security
c83d67a9b9 fix: resolve high vulnerability CVE-2025-66414 (#792)
Automatically generated security fix

Co-authored-by: orbisai0security <orbisai0security@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-07 12:53:45 +05:30
16 changed files with 539 additions and 59 deletions

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
1. First, fetch the list of labels available in this repository by running: `gh label list`. Run exactly this command with nothing else.
2. Next, use gh commands to get context about the issue:
- Use `gh issue view ${{ github.event.issue.number }}` to retrieve the current issue's details
- Use `gh search issues` to find similar issues that might provide context for proper categorization
- You have access to these Bash commands:
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
- Bash(gh search:\*) - to search for similar issues
3. Analyze the issue content, considering:
- The issue title and description
- The type of issue (bug report, feature request, question, etc.)
- Technical areas mentioned
@@ -36,7 +34,6 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
- Components affected
4. Select appropriate labels from the available labels list provided above:
- Choose labels that accurately reflect the issue's nature
- Be specific but comprehensive
- IMPORTANT: Add a priority label (P1, P2, or P3) based on the label descriptions from gh label list

View File

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ Thank you for your interest in contributing to Claude Code Base Action! This doc
```
This script:
- Installs `act` if not present (requires Homebrew on macOS)
- Runs the GitHub Action workflow locally using Docker
- Requires your `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` to be set

View File

@@ -85,26 +85,26 @@ Add the following to your workflow file:
## Inputs
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| `show_full_output` | Show full JSON output (⚠️ May expose secrets - see [security docs](../docs/security.md#-full-output-security-warning)) | No | 'false'\*\* |
\*Either `prompt` or `prompt_file` must be provided, but not both.
@@ -490,7 +490,6 @@ This example shows how to use OIDC authentication with GCP Vertex AI:
To securely use your Anthropic API key:
1. Add your API key as a repository secret:
- Go to your repository's Settings
- Navigate to "Secrets and variables" → "Actions"
- Click "New repository secret"

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
"name": "mcp-test",
"version": "1.0.0",
"dependencies": {
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0"
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.24.0"
}
}

View File

@@ -116,7 +116,6 @@ The `additional_permissions` input allows Claude to access GitHub Actions workfl
To allow Claude to view workflow run results, job logs, and CI status:
1. **Grant the necessary permission to your GitHub token**:
- When using the default `GITHUB_TOKEN`, add the `actions: read` permission to your workflow:
```yaml

View File

@@ -228,12 +228,10 @@ jobs:
The action now automatically detects the appropriate mode:
1. **If `prompt` is provided** → Runs in **automation mode**
- Executes immediately without waiting for @claude mentions
- Perfect for scheduled tasks, PR automation, etc.
2. **If no `prompt` but @claude is mentioned** → Runs in **interactive mode**
- Waits for and responds to @claude mentions
- Creates tracking comments with progress

View File

@@ -75,14 +75,12 @@ Commits will show as verified and attributed to the GitHub account that owns the
```
2. Add the **public key** to your GitHub account:
- Go to GitHub → Settings → SSH and GPG keys
- Click "New SSH key"
- Select **Key type: Signing Key** (important)
- Paste the contents of `~/.ssh/signing_key.pub`
3. Add the **private key** to your repository secrets:
- Go to your repo → Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions
- Create a new secret named `SSH_SIGNING_KEY`
- Paste the contents of `~/.ssh/signing_key`

View File

@@ -31,27 +31,23 @@ The fastest way to create a custom GitHub App is using our pre-configured manife
**🚀 [Download the Quick Setup Tool](./create-app.html)** (Right-click → "Save Link As" or "Download Linked File")
After downloading, open `create-app.html` in your web browser:
- **For Personal Accounts:** Click the "Create App for Personal Account" button
- **For Organizations:** Enter your organization name and click "Create App for Organization"
The tool will automatically configure all required permissions and submit the manifest.
Alternatively, you can use the manifest file directly:
- Use the [`github-app-manifest.json`](../github-app-manifest.json) file from this repository
- Visit https://github.com/settings/apps/new (for personal) or your organization's app settings
- Look for the "Create from manifest" option and paste the JSON content
2. **Complete the creation flow:**
- GitHub will show you a preview of the app configuration
- Confirm the app name (you can customize it)
- Click "Create GitHub App"
- The app will be created with all required permissions automatically configured
3. **Generate and download a private key:**
- After creating the app, you'll be redirected to the app settings
- Scroll down to "Private keys"
- Click "Generate a private key"
@@ -64,7 +60,6 @@ The fastest way to create a custom GitHub App is using our pre-configured manife
If you prefer to configure the app manually or need custom permissions:
1. **Create a new GitHub App:**
- Go to https://github.com/settings/apps (for personal apps) or your organization's settings
- Click "New GitHub App"
- Configure the app with these minimum permissions:
@@ -77,19 +72,16 @@ If you prefer to configure the app manually or need custom permissions:
- Create the app
2. **Generate and download a private key:**
- After creating the app, scroll down to "Private keys"
- Click "Generate a private key"
- Download the `.pem` file (keep this secure!)
3. **Install the app on your repository:**
- Go to the app's settings page
- Click "Install App"
- Select the repositories where you want to use Claude
4. **Add the app credentials to your repository secrets:**
- Go to your repository's Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions
- Add these secrets:
- `APP_ID`: Your GitHub App's ID (found in the app settings)
@@ -138,7 +130,6 @@ For more information on creating GitHub Apps, see the [GitHub documentation](htt
To securely use your Anthropic API key:
1. Add your API key as a repository secret:
- Go to your repository's Settings
- Navigate to "Secrets and variables" → "Actions"
- Click "New repository secret"

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,26 @@ jobs:
!startsWith(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, 'claude-auto-fix-ci-')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Check for clawd-stop label
id: check_label
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
const prNumber = ${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number }};
const { data: pr } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
pull_number: prNumber
});
const hasClawdStop = pr.labels.some(label => label.name === 'clawd-stop');
if (hasClawdStop) {
console.log('PR has clawd-stop label, skipping auto-fix');
}
return hasClawdStop;
result-encoding: string
- name: Checkout code
if: steps.check_label.outputs.result != 'true'
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
@@ -29,11 +48,13 @@ jobs:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Setup git identity
if: steps.check_label.outputs.result != 'true'
run: |
git config --global user.email "claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git config --global user.name "claude[bot]"
- name: Create fix branch
if: steps.check_label.outputs.result != 'true'
id: branch
run: |
BRANCH_NAME="claude-auto-fix-ci-${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}-${{ github.run_id }}"
@@ -41,6 +62,7 @@ jobs:
echo "branch_name=$BRANCH_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Get CI failure details
if: steps.check_label.outputs.result != 'true'
id: failure_details
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
@@ -79,6 +101,7 @@ jobs:
};
- name: Fix CI failures with Claude
if: steps.check_label.outputs.result != 'true'
id: claude
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
with:

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import type { Octokits } from "../api/client";
import { ISSUE_QUERY, PR_QUERY, USER_QUERY } from "../api/queries/github";
import {
isIssueCommentEvent,
isIssuesEvent,
isPullRequestEvent,
isPullRequestReviewEvent,
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
type ParsedGitHubContext,
@@ -40,6 +42,31 @@ export function extractTriggerTimestamp(
return undefined;
}
/**
* Extracts the original title from the GitHub webhook payload.
* This is the title as it existed when the trigger event occurred.
*
* @param context - Parsed GitHub context from webhook
* @returns The original title string or undefined if not available
*/
export function extractOriginalTitle(
context: ParsedGitHubContext,
): string | undefined {
if (isIssueCommentEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.issue?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.pull_request?.title;
} else if (isIssuesEvent(context)) {
return context.payload.issue?.title;
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Filters comments to only include those that existed in their final state before the trigger time.
* This prevents malicious actors from editing comments after the trigger to inject harmful content.
@@ -146,6 +173,7 @@ type FetchDataParams = {
isPR: boolean;
triggerUsername?: string;
triggerTime?: string;
originalTitle?: string;
};
export type GitHubFileWithSHA = GitHubFile & {
@@ -169,6 +197,7 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
isPR,
triggerUsername,
triggerTime,
originalTitle,
}: FetchDataParams): Promise<FetchDataResult> {
const [owner, repo] = repository.split("/");
if (!owner || !repo) {
@@ -354,6 +383,11 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
triggerDisplayName = await fetchUserDisplayName(octokits, triggerUsername);
}
// Use the original title from the webhook payload if provided
if (originalTitle !== undefined) {
contextData.title = originalTitle;
}
return {
contextData,
comments,

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ export function formatContext(
): string {
if (isPR) {
const prData = contextData as GitHubPullRequest;
return `PR Title: ${prData.title}
const sanitizedTitle = sanitizeContent(prData.title);
return `PR Title: ${sanitizedTitle}
PR Author: ${prData.author.login}
PR Branch: ${prData.headRefName} -> ${prData.baseRefName}
PR State: ${prData.state}
@@ -24,7 +25,8 @@ Total Commits: ${prData.commits.totalCount}
Changed Files: ${prData.files.nodes.length} files`;
} else {
const issueData = contextData as GitHubIssue;
return `Issue Title: ${issueData.title}
const sanitizedTitle = sanitizeContent(issueData.title);
return `Issue Title: ${sanitizedTitle}
Issue Author: ${issueData.author.login}
Issue State: ${issueData.state}`;
}

View File

@@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { z } from "zod";
import { readFile, stat } from "fs/promises";
import { join } from "path";
import { resolve } from "path";
import { constants } from "fs";
import fetch from "node-fetch";
import { GITHUB_API_URL } from "../github/api/config";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../utils/retry";
import { validatePathWithinRepo } from "./path-validation";
type GitHubRef = {
object: {
@@ -213,12 +214,18 @@ server.tool(
throw new Error("GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable is required");
}
const processedFiles = files.map((filePath) => {
if (filePath.startsWith("/")) {
return filePath.slice(1);
}
return filePath;
});
// Validate all paths are within repository root and get full/relative paths
const resolvedRepoDir = resolve(REPO_DIR);
const validatedFiles = await Promise.all(
files.map(async (filePath) => {
const fullPath = await validatePathWithinRepo(filePath, REPO_DIR);
// Calculate the relative path for the git tree entry
// Use the original filePath (normalized) for the git path, not the symlink-resolved path
const normalizedPath = resolve(resolvedRepoDir, filePath);
const relativePath = normalizedPath.slice(resolvedRepoDir.length + 1);
return { fullPath, relativePath };
}),
);
// 1. Get the branch reference (create if doesn't exist)
const baseSha = await getOrCreateBranchRef(
@@ -247,18 +254,14 @@ server.tool(
// 3. Create tree entries for all files
const treeEntries = await Promise.all(
processedFiles.map(async (filePath) => {
const fullPath = filePath.startsWith("/")
? filePath
: join(REPO_DIR, filePath);
validatedFiles.map(async ({ fullPath, relativePath }) => {
// Get the proper file mode based on file permissions
const fileMode = await getFileMode(fullPath);
// Check if file is binary (images, etc.)
const isBinaryFile =
/\.(png|jpg|jpeg|gif|webp|ico|pdf|zip|tar|gz|exe|bin|woff|woff2|ttf|eot)$/i.test(
filePath,
relativePath,
);
if (isBinaryFile) {
@@ -284,7 +287,7 @@ server.tool(
if (!blobResponse.ok) {
const errorText = await blobResponse.text();
throw new Error(
`Failed to create blob for ${filePath}: ${blobResponse.status} - ${errorText}`,
`Failed to create blob for ${relativePath}: ${blobResponse.status} - ${errorText}`,
);
}
@@ -292,7 +295,7 @@ server.tool(
// Return tree entry with blob SHA
return {
path: filePath,
path: relativePath,
mode: fileMode,
type: "blob",
sha: blobData.sha,
@@ -301,7 +304,7 @@ server.tool(
// For text files, include content directly in tree
const content = await readFile(fullPath, "utf-8");
return {
path: filePath,
path: relativePath,
mode: fileMode,
type: "blob",
content: content,
@@ -421,7 +424,9 @@ server.tool(
author: newCommitData.author.name,
date: newCommitData.author.date,
},
files: processedFiles.map((path) => ({ path })),
files: validatedFiles.map(({ relativePath }) => ({
path: relativePath,
})),
tree: {
sha: treeData.sha,
},

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
import { realpath } from "fs/promises";
import { resolve, sep } from "path";
/**
* Validates that a file path resolves within the repository root.
* Prevents path traversal attacks via "../" sequences and symlinks.
* @param filePath - The file path to validate (can be relative or absolute)
* @param repoRoot - The repository root directory
* @returns The resolved absolute path (with symlinks resolved) if valid
* @throws Error if the path resolves outside the repository root
*/
export async function validatePathWithinRepo(
filePath: string,
repoRoot: string,
): Promise<string> {
// First resolve the path string (handles .. and . segments)
const initialPath = resolve(repoRoot, filePath);
// Resolve symlinks to get the real path
// This prevents symlink attacks where a link inside the repo points outside
let resolvedRoot: string;
let resolvedPath: string;
try {
resolvedRoot = await realpath(repoRoot);
} catch {
throw new Error(`Repository root '${repoRoot}' does not exist`);
}
try {
resolvedPath = await realpath(initialPath);
} catch {
// File doesn't exist yet - fall back to checking the parent directory
// This handles the case where we're creating a new file
const parentDir = resolve(initialPath, "..");
try {
const resolvedParent = await realpath(parentDir);
if (
resolvedParent !== resolvedRoot &&
!resolvedParent.startsWith(resolvedRoot + sep)
) {
throw new Error(
`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`,
);
}
// Parent is valid, return the initial path since file doesn't exist yet
return initialPath;
} catch {
throw new Error(
`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`,
);
}
}
// Path must be within repo root (or be the root itself)
if (
resolvedPath !== resolvedRoot &&
!resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedRoot + sep)
) {
throw new Error(`Path '${filePath}' resolves outside the repository root`);
}
return resolvedPath;
}

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { prepareMcpConfig } from "../../mcp/install-mcp-server";
import {
fetchGitHubData,
extractTriggerTimestamp,
extractOriginalTitle,
} from "../../github/data/fetcher";
import { createPrompt, generateDefaultPrompt } from "../../create-prompt";
import { isEntityContext } from "../../github/context";
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ export const tagMode: Mode = {
const commentId = commentData.id;
const triggerTime = extractTriggerTimestamp(context);
const originalTitle = extractOriginalTitle(context);
const githubData = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: octokit,
@@ -86,6 +88,7 @@ export const tagMode: Mode = {
isPR: context.isPR,
triggerUsername: context.actor,
triggerTime,
originalTitle,
});
// Setup branch

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { describe, expect, it, jest } from "bun:test";
import {
extractTriggerTimestamp,
extractOriginalTitle,
fetchGitHubData,
filterCommentsToTriggerTime,
filterReviewsToTriggerTime,
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ import {
import {
createMockContext,
mockIssueCommentContext,
mockPullRequestCommentContext,
mockPullRequestReviewContext,
mockPullRequestReviewCommentContext,
mockPullRequestOpenedContext,
@@ -63,6 +65,47 @@ describe("extractTriggerTimestamp", () => {
});
});
describe("extractOriginalTitle", () => {
it("should extract title from IssueCommentEvent on PR", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestCommentContext);
expect(title).toBe("Fix: Memory leak in user service");
});
it("should extract title from PullRequestReviewEvent", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestReviewContext);
expect(title).toBe("Refactor: Improve error handling in API layer");
});
it("should extract title from PullRequestReviewCommentEvent", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestReviewCommentContext);
expect(title).toBe("Performance: Optimize search algorithm");
});
it("should extract title from pull_request event", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockPullRequestOpenedContext);
expect(title).toBe("Feature: Add user authentication");
});
it("should extract title from issues event", () => {
const title = extractOriginalTitle(mockIssueOpenedContext);
expect(title).toBe("Bug: Application crashes on startup");
});
it("should return undefined for event without title", () => {
const context = createMockContext({
eventName: "issue_comment",
payload: {
comment: {
id: 123,
body: "test",
},
} as any,
});
const title = extractOriginalTitle(context);
expect(title).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe("filterCommentsToTriggerTime", () => {
const createMockComment = (
createdAt: string,
@@ -945,4 +988,115 @@ describe("fetchGitHubData integration with time filtering", () => {
);
expect(hasPrBodyInMap).toBe(false);
});
it("should use originalTitle when provided instead of fetched title", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Fetched Title From GraphQL",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
originalTitle: "Original Title From Webhook",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe("Original Title From Webhook");
});
it("should use fetched title when originalTitle is not provided", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Fetched Title From GraphQL",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe("Fetched Title From GraphQL");
});
it("should use original title from webhook even if title was edited after trigger", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 123,
title: "Edited Title (from GraphQL)",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
createdAt: "2024-01-15T10:00:00Z",
lastEditedAt: "2024-01-15T12:30:00Z", // Edited after trigger
additions: 10,
deletions: 5,
state: "OPEN",
commits: { totalCount: 1, nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
comments: { nodes: [] },
reviews: { nodes: [] },
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: jest.fn() as any,
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "123",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
triggerTime: "2024-01-15T12:00:00Z",
originalTitle: "Original Title (from webhook at trigger time)",
});
expect(result.contextData.title).toBe(
"Original Title (from webhook at trigger time)",
);
});
});

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import { describe, expect, it, beforeAll, afterAll } from "bun:test";
import { validatePathWithinRepo } from "../src/mcp/path-validation";
import { resolve } from "path";
import { mkdir, writeFile, symlink, rm, realpath } from "fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
describe("validatePathWithinRepo", () => {
// Use a real temp directory for tests that need filesystem access
let testDir: string;
let repoRoot: string;
let outsideDir: string;
// Real paths after symlink resolution (e.g., /tmp -> /private/tmp on macOS)
let realRepoRoot: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
// Create test directory structure
testDir = resolve(tmpdir(), `path-validation-test-${Date.now()}`);
repoRoot = resolve(testDir, "repo");
outsideDir = resolve(testDir, "outside");
await mkdir(repoRoot, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(resolve(repoRoot, "src"), { recursive: true });
await mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
// Create test files
await writeFile(resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt"), "inside repo");
await writeFile(resolve(repoRoot, "src", "main.js"), "console.log('hi')");
await writeFile(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), "sensitive data");
// Get real paths after symlink resolution
realRepoRoot = await realpath(repoRoot);
});
afterAll(async () => {
// Cleanup
await rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
describe("valid paths", () => {
it("should accept simple relative paths", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("file.txt", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept nested relative paths", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should accept paths with single dot segments", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("./src/main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should accept paths that use .. but resolve inside repo", async () => {
// src/../file.txt resolves to file.txt which is still inside repo
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/../file.txt", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept absolute paths within the repo root", async () => {
const absolutePath = resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt");
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo(absolutePath, repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
});
it("should accept the repo root itself", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo(".", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(realRepoRoot);
});
it("should handle new files (non-existent) in valid directories", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/newfile.js", repoRoot);
// For non-existent files, we validate the parent but return the initial path
// (can't realpath a file that doesn't exist yet)
expect(result).toBe(resolve(repoRoot, "src/newfile.js"));
});
});
describe("path traversal attacks", () => {
it("should reject simple parent directory traversal", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("../outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject deeply nested parent directory traversal", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("../../../etc/passwd", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject traversal hidden within path", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("src/../../outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject traversal at the end of path", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("src/../..", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject absolute paths outside the repo root", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("/etc/passwd", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
it("should reject absolute paths to sibling directories", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
});
});
describe("symlink attacks", () => {
it("should reject symlinks pointing outside the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink inside the repo that points to a file outside
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "evil-link");
await symlink(resolve(outsideDir, "secret.txt"), symlinkPath);
try {
// The symlink path looks like it's inside the repo, but points outside
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("evil-link", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should reject symlinks to parent directories", async () => {
// Create a symlink to the parent directory
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "parent-link");
await symlink(testDir, symlinkPath);
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("parent-link/outside/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should accept symlinks that resolve within the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink inside the repo that points to another file inside
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "good-link");
await symlink(resolve(repoRoot, "file.txt"), symlinkPath);
try {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("good-link", repoRoot);
// Should resolve to the actual file location
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "file.txt"));
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
it("should reject directory symlinks that escape the repo", async () => {
// Create a symlink to outside directory
const symlinkPath = resolve(repoRoot, "escape-dir");
await symlink(outsideDir, symlinkPath);
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("escape-dir/secret.txt", repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(symlinkPath, { force: true });
}
});
});
describe("edge cases", () => {
it("should handle empty path (current directory)", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(realRepoRoot);
});
it("should handle paths with multiple consecutive slashes", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src//main.js", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src/main.js"));
});
it("should handle paths with trailing slashes", async () => {
const result = await validatePathWithinRepo("src/", repoRoot);
expect(result).toBe(resolve(realRepoRoot, "src"));
});
it("should reject prefix attack (repo root as prefix but not parent)", async () => {
// Create a sibling directory with repo name as prefix
const evilDir = repoRoot + "-evil";
await mkdir(evilDir, { recursive: true });
await writeFile(resolve(evilDir, "file.txt"), "evil");
try {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo(resolve(evilDir, "file.txt"), repoRoot),
).rejects.toThrow(/resolves outside the repository root/);
} finally {
await rm(evilDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("should throw error for non-existent repo root", async () => {
await expect(
validatePathWithinRepo("file.txt", "/nonexistent/repo"),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not exist/);
});
});
});